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 ABSTRACT
According to decentralized character of the EU legal system, national courts are the 
ordinary courts in matters of EU law and should as such guarantee effective legal 
protection of individual’s rights deriving from EU law. To ensure uniform application 
of EU law provisions and especially to prevent possible divergent interpretations, a 
preliminary ruling procedure was created, found in Article 267 TFEU. On the basis 
of mentioned Article national courts may, and sometimes must, refer a question to 
the CJEU and ask for clarifi cation of the meaning or review of the validity of an act 
of EU law which is of relevance to the case upon which national courts need to adju-
dicate, since the CJEU has an exclusive monopoly of interpretation on questions of 
EU law. This Paper deals with a question, when national courts have the right and 
when the duty to refer questions to the CJEU and which are the exceptions to this 
obligation. Possible legal consequences, that may follow if national courts do not 
fulfi l their obligations, are discussed in short as well. 
*  PhD candidate at the Faculty of Law, University of Maribor
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1. INTRODUCTION
Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union (hereinafter: TEU)1 provides that the 
function of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: CJEU) is to 
‘ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is ob-
served.’ Given that the CJEU has ultimate authority in deciding on all questions 
of European Union (hereinafter: EU, also Union) law, means that it must have 
jurisdiction to determine points of EU law even when they arise in proceedings 
brought before national courts. Yet this power is only available to be exercised 
if national courts of the EU Member States refer the issues about the validity or 
interpretation of the EU law in question to the CJEU and if the possibility to re-
fer a question as such is there for the national courts to exercise. For this purpose 
a unique preliminary reference mechanism was created, settled in Article 267 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter: TFEU).2
According to mentioned Article in a preliminary ruling procedure the national 
court makes a decision to request an explanation from the CJEU on matters of 
EU law arisen in the national proceeding. By clarifying such legal matters the 
CJEU may ensure uniform application of the EU law throughout the Member 
States and offer useful guidance to the referring courts in particular cases on 
correct interpretation of EU law. The right and in some cases the duty of nation-
al courts to refer a question for a preliminary ruling follows directly from the 
TFEU and is independent of the existence of any national procedural rule, since 
this is a sui generis procedure based on the Treaty itself. National legal rules can 
supplement but cannot restrict these rules of the TFEU.3 It thus follows that the 
national court can initiate a reference for a preliminary ruling even if its own 
domestic law does not regulate this issue or its procedural framework.4
However and irrespective of the foregoing the practice has shown that national 
courts are often reluctant to send questions for preliminary ruling to the CJEU. 
This can be deducted from statistics and comparison of a total number of refer-
ences from various Member States. Lately the debates were focused especially 
on the fact, that low number of references is a feature particularly of the new 
Member States.5 One can hardly conclude whether this means, that in some 
1  OJ C 326 of 26. 10. 2012.
2  OJ C 326 of 26. 10. 2012.
3  See e.g.: Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA (II) 
[1978] ECR 0629, paras. 20-22.; Case C-348/89 Mecanarte - Metalurgica da Lagoa Lda v 
Chefe do Serviço da Conferencia Final da Alfândega do Porto [1991] ECR I-3277, para. 45.
4  See also: Blutman L.; The Cartesio judgment: Empowering lower courts by the European 
Court of Justice; Pravo i Politika (ISSN 1820-7529); Vol. III., 2010/2.; pp. 95-106; page 96.
5  E.g.: From Republic Slovenia (since the entrance into EU integration on the 1. May 2004 
and until now) there were only four questions referred for a preliminary ruling. The fi rst one in 
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new Member States EU law is not applied at all, or whether the national courts 
in new Member States master EU law in such a way, that no assistance of the 
CJEU is required. But when the latter is not the case, national courts of specif-
ic Member State that are under obligation to start a reference procedure should 
be aware, that not referring a question for a preliminary ruling constitutes a 
breach of EU law, which may result in different unfavourable consequences 
for that Member State. That would not be the case only when the specifi c cir-
cumstances would be given, that are by the CJEU itself determined as the only 
justifi able exceptions for not referring a question. Those mentioned exceptions 
for not referring a question, however, are not as easy to use and as clear as one 
could expect. In fact it is rather diffi cult to fulfi l all the conditions in practice 
as is explained later on in this paper.
2. REFERRING A QUESTION – A RIGHT AND A DUTY
In principle, the question whether to make a reference falls within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the national court. It enjoys absolute discretion and may 
make a reference on its own motion, regardless from any interference from the 
litigants6 or constraints imposed by national law.7 In deciding whether to make 
case Detiček (C-403/09) was send only in 2009, the second one also in 2009 in case C-536/09 
Omejc, the third one in the case C-603/10 Pelati in 2010 and the fourth one in 2011 in case 
C-541/11 Grilc. Only four questions are placing Slovenia among the least active Member States 
together with Cyprus and Malta, as regards participation in European judicial dialogue. At this 
point it is also necessary to emphasize another aspect, i.e. the right of all Member States to 
intervene in a preliminary ruling procedure and thus importantly infl uence on the development 
of EU law. Until now Slovenia in almost ten years of membership in the EU intervened in ap-
proximately 27 preliminary ruling proceedings. Although this fi gure at fi rst glance may seem 
encouraging, it should be noted however, that each year there are approximately 400 proposals 
for a preliminary ruling procedure all together. Therefore it would be desirable to hear the 
voice of Slovenia on several occasions. This would not only increase the visibility of Slovenia 
in the European institutions, but would also be an opportunity for its infl uence on the develop-
ment of EU law, which is not created only in the EU’s legislative bodies, but with the case law 
of the CJEU as well. More interventions in preliminary ruling procedures would therefore be 
in the interest of Slovenia itself, especially in matters that may have signifi cant impact on the 
Slovenian legal order. The same applies to all other Member States.
6  In Case 126/80 Salonia v. Poidomani and Giglio [1981] ECR 1563, para. 7, it was held 
that a national court must be free to make a reference on its own motion even contrary to the 
wishes of the parties. Also, the national court alone has power to determine the questions to 
be referred, the parties to the main action being unable to change their content or scope. See 
also: Case 44/65 Hessische Knappschaft [1965] ECR 965; Joined Cases C-34–135/91 Kerafi na 
[1992] ECR I-5699.
7  The CJEU has emphasized that the discretion of the national court to make a reference 
cannot be compromised by rules of national law, for example a rule that the referring court is 
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a reference national court must consider that a decision of the CJEU on the 
question of EU law arising in the proceedings before it ‘is necessary to give 
judgement’. This, in general, means that the result of the case must depend 
upon the decision of the CJEU, but it is accepted that necessity exists even 
when the decision is only potentially conclusive.8 A reference is not necessary 
if the answer to the question, regardless of what it may be, can in no way af-
fect the outcome of the case.9 The decision at what stage in the proceeding a 
question should be referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling is dictated 
by considerations of procedural economy and effi ciency to be weighed only by 
the national court and not by the CJEU.10
2.1. DISCRETIONARY AND MANDATORY REFERENCES
Article 267 TFEU provides that the CJEU shall have jurisdiction to give pre-
liminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity 
and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies offi ces or agencies of the 
Union; where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Mem-
ber State and if that court or tribunal considers that a decision on the question 
is necessary to enable it to give judgment. However, where any such question 
is raised in a case pending before a court of tribunal of a Member State against 
whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or 
tribunal shall bring the matter before the CJEU.
It follows, that Article 267 TFEU distinguishes between appealable and 
non-appealable decisions. As regards appealable decisions, the provision in 
its second paragraph (Article 267(2) TFEU) vests in the national courts and 
tribunals the right—but not the duty—to make preliminary references on ques-
tions of validity or interpretation of EU law. Such courts will only have the 
obligation to refer, if they contemplate declaring an EU act invalid.11 In that 
situation, the obligation to refer cannot be mitigated not even by the acte clair 
bound by the decisions of a superior court. See e.g.: Case 166/73 Rheinmuhlen v. Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle Getreide [1974] ECR 33, paras. 3–4; Case 146/73 Rheinmuhlen- Dusseldorf v. 
Einfuhrund Vorratsstelle Getreide [1974] ECR 139.
8  See also: Tridimas T.; Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Effi ciency and Defi -
ance in the Preliminary Reference Procedure; Common Market Law Review 40 (2003); pp. 
9 – 50.
9  Case 283/81 CILFIT v Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 3415.
10  Case 14/86 Pretore di Salo v Persons Unknown [1987] ECR 2545.
11  See e.g.: Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199; Case C-344/04 IATA [2006] ECR 
I-403; Case C-119/05 Lucchini [2007] ECR I-6199; and Case C-461/03 Gaston Schul [2005] 
ECR I-10513.
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or acte éclairé principles explained further on in this paper, since a national 
court cannot declare an EU act invalid, even if similar provisions in another, 
comparable legal act, have already been declared invalid by the CJEU.
In contrast to just explained, where a question of EU law ‘is raised in a case 
pending before a national court or tribunal’ whose decision is non-appeal-
able, that national court or tribunal ‘shall bring the matter’ before the CJEU. 
According to its wording, Article 267(3) TFEU imposes on all Member State 
courts of last instance an unconditional obligation to refer a question for pre-
liminary ruling, when that court is not sure about the right interpretation or 
validity of certain EU law provision.12 This seemingly indicates that there is 
no discretion when there is no further possible judicial remedy under nation-
al law; however, a court of last instance is not under any obligation to refer 
a preliminary question on the interpretation of EU law, if the answer to the 
question is not relevant to the ultimate outcome of the main action. Moreover, 
a court of last instance can refrain from making a reference, if, on the basis 
of national law, it arrives at a result that makes otherwise relevant EU law 
provision obsolete for the resolution of the dispute. This situation may arise 
where national procedural rules are stating, that the matter that gives rise to 
a problem in EU law cannot be judged, for example, where a claim under EU 
law is being brought after the expiry of the period of limitation laid down in 
national procedural law.13 
In most Member States, the direct competence of a national judge to request a 
preliminary ruling from the CJEU has its refl ection in the national procedural 
law. This principle of national procedural autonomy nevertheless has some 
restriction.14 But even in the absence of any such explicit provision in national 
law, a national court would still be entitled to make a preliminary reference 
under direct application of Article 267 TFEU, since the right and in some 
cases the duty of national courts to refer questions for a preliminary ruling 
follows directly from the TFEU and is independent of the existence of any 
12  See also: Fenger N., Broberg M.; Finding Light in the Darkness: On the Actual Application 
of the acte clair Doctrine; Yearbook of European Law (2011); Volume 30, Issue 1; pp. 180–212; 
page 181.
13  Ibidem, page 183.
14  Such as the principle of equivalence (national procedural rules designed to ensure the pro-
tection of the rights which individuals acquire under Union law should not be less favourable 
than those governing similar domestic situations) and the principle of effectiveness (those rules 
should not render impossible in practice or excessively diffi cult the exercise of rights conferred 
by the EU legal order). See Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfi nanz eG [1976] ECR 1989, para. 5; since 
then repeated in dozens of cases, e.g. Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043, para. 13; Case 
C-128/93 Fisscher [1994] ECR I-4583, para. 39; Case C-410/92 Johnson [1994] ECR I-5483, 
para. 21; Case C-78/98 Preston [2000] ECR I-3201, para. 31.
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national legal rule. Therefore the national court can initiate a reference for a 
preliminary ruling even if its own domestic law does not regulate this option 
or its procedural framework,15 since the absence of domestic legal regulation 
does not impede preliminary references.16
3. EXCEPTIONS – WHEN THERE IS NO DUTY TO REFER
Although Article 267(3) of the TFEU clearly specifi es that national courts act-
ing as a fi nal resort are obliged to exercise the reference for a preliminary rul-
ing, the CJEU in its practice developed some exceptions to this obligation and 
stressed that national courts of last instance nevertheless have some discretion.
In the well-known CILFIT judgment (and many cases that followed) the CJEU 
emphasized, that a court or tribunal, against whose decisions there is no ju-
dicial remedy under national law, is required, where a question of EU law is 
raised before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the 
CJEU, unless it has established that the question raised is (i) irrelevant or (ii) 
that the provision of EU law in question has already been interpreted by the 
CJEU (acte éclairé) or (iii) that the correct application of EU law is so obvious 
as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt (acte clair).17 
3.1. QUESTION RAISED IS IRRELEVANT TO FINAL JUDGMENT
The national court of last instance is deprived of the obligation to refer a ques-
tion for a preliminary ruling, if that question is not relevant, that is to say, if the 
answer to that question can in no way affect the outcome of the main proceed-
ing.18 Thus the national court is vested discretion in decision whether or not to 
make a preliminary reference.
Such an exception established by the CJEU in the CILFT case is not a great 
surprise, considering the fact, that also Article 267 TFEU itself imposes the 
obligation to submit a question for a preliminary ruling only, if national court 
considers that a decision on that question is necessary to enable it to give judg-
ment. Therefore according to the wording of the mentioned Article, there is no 
15  The domestic law of several Member States does not contain separate procedural legal 
provisions about referring for a preliminary ruling (with the exception of, for example, Scot-
land, England and Wales, Austria).
16  See also: Blutman L., 2010, supra n. 4, page 96.
17  Case 283/81 CILFIT v Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 3415, paras. 10, 13, 14, 16, 21.
18  Ibidem, para 12.
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obligation to refer a question, when the guidance of the CJEU is not indispens-
able for the national judge to reach his fi nal decision in the main proceeding.
The most positive outcome of this exception is that it protects the CJEU from 
overwhelming fl ood of unnecessary cases and it furthermore inhibits unrea-
sonable lengthening of the proceeding before the national court. In this respect 
one should not forget that in the absence of this exception there could be a 
danger, that in practice the parties would otherwise try to intentionally abuse a 
preliminary ruling as an instrument how to defer the fi nal decision of the na-
tional court, even if the national court in this regard is not obliged to take into 
account all the proposals made by the parties of the case, but should instead 
always start reference procedure on its own motion.19
3.2. QUESTION HAS ALREADY BEEN INTERPRETED BY THE CJEU 
(ACTE ÉCLAIRÉ DOCTRINE)
The second valid justifi cation for not submitting a preliminary question to the 
CJEU is represented by a doctrine known in the francophone legal world as 
acte éclairé - that is ‘explained’. The CJEU stated already in 1962 in Da Costa 
case20 that ‘an interpretation under Article 177 (now 267 TFEU) already given 
by the CJEU may deprive the obligation of its purpose and thus empty it of 
its substance’. In the literature and the CJEU jargon this is often referred to 
as ‘settled case law’. Mentioned situation exists, where previous decisions of 
the CJEU have already dealt with the point of law in question, irrespective of 
the nature of the proceedings which led to those decisions and even if there 
is not complete congruity between the previous question and the question at 
issue, provided that the legal situation can nevertheless be held to have been 
unambiguously clarifi ed through the ruling of the CJEU in the earlier case.21
The acte éclairé doctrine in practice means, that the decision of the national 
court is based on the effect of precedent under specifi c circumstances and not 
on the national court’s own original interpretation of the EU law. Because 
this exception to the obligation of the national courts to submit a request for 
19  See also: Navratilova M.; The Preliminary Ruling before The Constitutional Courts; 
Ústavní soud, Česká republika; available at: <www.law.muni.cz/sborniky/dp08/fi les/pdf/mez-
inaro/navratilova.pdf> (12.2.2014); page 2.
20  Joined Cases 28/62-30/62 Da Costa en Schaake NV, Jacob Meijer NV, Hoechst-Holland 
NV v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 31. See also: Case 66/80 ICC 
[1981] ECR 1191; Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior [1997] ECR I-6013; Case C-421/06 
Fratelli Martini [2007] ECR I-152; and Case C-260/07 Pedro IV Servicios [2009] ECR I-2437.
21  Case 283/81 CILFIT, para 13, 14.
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a preliminary ruling to the CJEU is based on precedent, the national court 
is always at liberty to nevertheless make such a request, even when there has 
been settled case law, especially when it is of the opinion that the conditions 
of the case sub-judice are slightly different from earlier precedents and also 
when it would like to receive some additional guidance, or even when it may 
want the CJEU to change its earlier case law. When national court on the other 
hand takes its fi nal decision within the framework of the earlier settled case 
law, there is of course no reason to submit a request for a preliminary ruling. 
In this situation there is always a risk, however, that the national court does not 
make the correct decision and may err in its interpretation of settled case law.22
3.3. CORRECT APPLICATION OF EU LAW IS OBVIOUS (ACTE CLAIR 
DOCTRINE)
The third exception for not submitting a request for a preliminary ruling is the 
acte clair doctrine, which is applicable, if the correct application of the EU law 
is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner 
in which the question raised is to be resolved.23 For an acte clair to exist, the 
conditions are very strict, since a subjective conviction of a national court of 
last instance is not suffi cient. I.e. a national court must be convinced that the 
matter is equally obvious to all the other courts, not only in the same Member 
State but in all Member States of the EU and to the CJEU as well. Therefore, 
when interpreting EU law, a national court against whose decision there is no 
appeal, must take into consideration the specifi c characteristics of the EU law. 
It means to compare different language versions of EU legal acts, since EU 
legislation is drafted in several offi cial languages and all the different language 
versions are equally authentic. Moreover national court must be aware of pos-
sible divergences in the meaning of legal concepts and used terminology in EU 
law and in the law of the various Member States and furthermore consider the 
context and the objectives of EU law itself.24 To say it differently, the existence 
of acte clair must be assessed with taking into account the peculiar features of 
EU law, the particular diffi culties to which its interpretation gives rise and the 
risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the Union. Furthermore every 
provision of EU law must be placed in its context and interpreted in the light 
of provisions of EU law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof 
22  See also: Vaistendael F.; Consequences of the Acte Clair doctrine for the National courts 
and temporal effects of an ECJ decision; K.U.Leuven; 2007; I.B.F.D. Amsterdam; page 3.
23  Case 283/81 CILFIT, para. 16.
24  See also: Navratilova M., supra n. 19, page 2.
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and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to 
be applied.25
The important aspect of the acte clair doctrine is, that it is not based on prec-
edent by the CJEU. It is rather based on the inexorable logic of the EU law 
and the conviction of the national court, that the CJEU and other national 
courts could not under any circumstance come to a different interpretation 
and application of EU law in question. Precisely because the national court is 
absolutely convinced about the correctness of its judgment under Union law, 
there is no need to submit the questions to the CJEU. If national court would 
have any doubts on the application of EU law, it would need the guidance of 
the CJEU and would be obliged to submit the case to the latter.26 It should 
be noted, however, that even were a national court of last instance considers 
an EU law provision as clair, it is not prevented from making a preliminary 
ruling.27 Further, the fact that another national court has made a preliminary 
ruling regarding the interpretation of the same provision of EU law, does not in 
itself exclude the existence of acte clair for another national court that is faced 
with the same legal question.
3.4. OPEN QUESTIONS OF ACLE CLAIRE DOCTRINE
As pointed out above, the CJEU accepted that in principle a national court of 
last instance may refrain from making a reference for a preliminary ruling 
where the legal position is unambiguous, whilst it simultaneously laid down 
a number of conditions that are unusually diffi cult to satisfy in practice. It 
follows that even though at fi rst the interpretation of some EU legal act may 
appear obvious, it may nevertheless prove to be much less so on closer scrutiny, 
especially when taking into consideration meticulous guidelines given by the 
CJEU.
Already the condition, that the matter is equally clear to all the other courts 
raises some open questions, since it will be rather diffi cult for the court of last 
instance to considered the provision as ‘acte clair’, especially if the judges at 
lower stages supported a diverging interpretation. Besides if the fi nal decision 
must be reached in a Chamber of more judges and already among the judg-
es, who are to decide the actual case, there is disagreement about the correct 
abstract interpretation of the relevant EU law provision, then it seems rather 
diffi cult to maintain convincingly that all the other national courts in the EU 
25  See also: Tridimas T., 2003, supra n. 8, page 43.
26  See also: Vaistendael F., supra n. 22, page 3.
27  See Joined Cases C-428/06-434/06 UGT-Rioja [2008] ECR-I-6747, para. 43.
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will agree with the majority of judges in a Chamber and that no one will reach 
the same interpretation as the dissenting member of the national court. 
However, the bar is set even higher when the national court must also be con-
vinced not only that other national courts will arrive to the same interpreta-
tion of EU law provision, but also that they will consider the outcome to be 
‘obvious’. As Advocate General Stix-Hackl argued, ultimately the national 
court can only rely on its own judgment. In contrast, it cannot realistically 
engage in imagining the workings of the minds of other judges whom it 
has never met and actually convince itself about the minds of these other 
persons.28 Not to mention the fact, that the very existence of some diverged 
decisions by other national courts, where their interpretation of a given EU 
rule confl icts with the interpretation that the national court at stage considers 
to be correct, will in most instances in itself deprive the very court from con-
cluding, that no other court would come to a conclusion which differs from 
the one favoured by the court, that is dealing with the same provision in the 
main proceeding.29
It follows that the criterion, that the national court invoking acte clair must be 
convinced about how other judges will view the interpretative issue at stake, is 
close to impossible to fulfi l and is undoubtedly much stricter requirement, than 
the need solely for the national judge alone to feel certain about the correct 
interpretation of the rule in question.30
It is apparent that the conditions for application of acte clair rule are unreal-
izable for a national judge, since the CJEU forces a national court to use the 
same methodology as is used by the CJEU itself and also by all the other na-
tional courts. On the one hand, it is comprehensible since the standard of the 
EU law interpretation must be uniform. On the other hand, a national judge 
usually does not speak fl uently several offi cial languages of the EU, so as to 
be able to compare different language versions. Therefore it is unrealistic to 
expect from the court of last instance to be able to undertake a qualifi ed re-
view of the meaning of any given EU act in all offi cial language versions, even 
though in many cases that involve interpretation of EU law, a comparison be-
tween different language versions would be relevant. What is more, a national 
judge equally does not dispose of vast administrative and translation body 
ready to prepare an analysis of the relevant case-law, the same as it is in the 
case of the CJEU. Moreover the duty to fi nd information about the case-law 
28  The Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl in Case C-495/03 Intermodal Transports BV 
[2005] ECR I-8151, para. 94.
29  See also: Fenger N., Broberg M., 2011, supra n. 12, page 181.
30  Ibidem, page 187.
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of other Member States is illusory. One could conclude, that the way how a 
national court should proceed when fulfi lling all the conditions for acte clair 
doctrine, is so burdensome that simply making a preliminary reference could 
often be regarded as an easier way to proceed, than trying to resolve a question 
of interpretation of EU law independently.31
In addition of the complexity of the strict criteria and the burdensome process 
itself, through which a national court should check the fulfi lment of the con-
ditions, there are several additional issues worth mentioning. Firstly it should 
not be overestimated, that in the case of acte claire doctrine the CJEU has 
not ruled on the issue at question yet. This entails a risk of different national 
courts, including Supreme Courts, coming to mutually confl icting conclusions. 
Furthermore, a suspicion may occur, whether the right to refrain from making 
a reference was abused by national courts, that wish to exclude the CJEU when 
they are about to decide certain cases.32
Secondly, the very fact that the CJEU has a tendency to develop its case-law 
in a dynamic fashion and that it retains the right to overrule previous case-law, 
makes it close to impossible to be absolutely certain about the correct interpre-
tation of certain EU law provision, even where the situation would otherwise 
seems to be one of acte éclairé.33
Last but not least, a special regard should be given also to the relationship 
between acte claire doctrine and temporal effect of the fi nal judgment. The 
link between the mentioned two is in the fact, that when the interpretation of 
a question of EU law is totally clear in the sense of an acte clair and national 
provisions are maintained in violation of the EU treaty provisions, there can 
be no excuse for a Member State to claim limitations in the temporal effect 
of a national decision. Indeed acte clair in this situation means that the whole 
framework of EU law dictates a solution for which there cannot be the slightest 
doubt. A decision by a national judge based on acte clair therefore should nec-
essarily have the effect ex tunc as far as the interpretation of the EU law and 
its application in the national legal order is concerned, taking into account that 
also the judgment of the CJEU under preliminary ruling procedure has the ef-
fect from the day, when a specifi c provision (that was subject to interpretation) 
entered into force and that the interpretation of the CJEU becomes a part of 
that interpreted provision.34
31  See also: Navratilova M., supra n. 19, page 3.
32  See also: Fenger N., Broberg M., 2011, supra n. 12, page 186.
33  Ibidem, page 181.
34  See also: Vaistendael F., supra n. 22, page 9.
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To summarise, it is apparent that in CILFIT the CJEU acknowledged the appli-
cation of this doctrine, but simultaneously attached some very strict conditions 
to it, especially for circumscribing the scope of the doctrine and also to interpret 
the acte clair doctrine restrictively in order to avoid abuses. Whilst this should 
mean that a national court of last instance would only be able to rely on the acte 
clair doctrine in rare cases, in reality it seems that the doctrine has gained wide-
spread application, far exceeding what is dictated by the strict criteria. I.e. the 
approach in subsequent case law of the national courts has been more pragmatic, 
taking into account, inter alia, considerations such as the importance of the case 
to the parties; the issue of delay at the national stage that can be a consequence 
of referring a question for a preliminary ruling; and the costs associated with 
the making of a reference.35 It follows that the acte clair doctrine has attained 
considerable importance in practice, since the national courts of last instance 
apply a signifi cantly more relaxed interpretation thereof, thus indicating, that 
they have overlooked the fact, that this actually violates EU law as such and their 
obligations under Article 267 TFEU more precisely.
4.  LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR THE INFRINGEMENT 
OF THE OBLIGATION TO MAKE A REFERENCE FOR A 
PRELIMINARY RULING
It is undoubtedly that the failure by a court or tribunal of last instance to make 
a reference for a preliminary ruling, when it’s under obligation to do so, con-
stitutes a breach of Article 267 TFEU. It should be highlighted, however, that 
the TFEU does not explicitly specify any direct sanctions for a national court’s 
failure to comply with the obligation to make a reference. Nevertheless on 
three different levels, i.e. national, Union and international and under specifi c 
conditions for each of them, four types of possible consequences all together 
may be identifi ed in such situation. They are as follows:
− invalidity of the national ruling or duty to reopen the case at a national level;
− claims for damages at the national level;
− infringement proceedings at the Union level; and
− breach of Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights36 (here-
inafter: ECHR).
35  See also: Broberg M.; Acte clair revisited: Adapting the acte clair criteria to the demands 
of the times (2008); Common Market Law Review 4; Issue 5; pp. 1383–1397; page 1384.
36  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended 
by Protocol No. 11, with Protocol Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13, 2003.
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To say it differently, there are two possible remedies on the national level. First 
remedy is based on the principle of the ‘lawful judge’ which basically means, 
that the arbitrary refusal of a national court of last instance to make a refer-
ence to the CJEU may, on the basis of an individual constitutional complaint, 
be subject to review by the national Constitutional Court. The lawful judge 
approach may work, provided that three conditions are satisfi ed. Firstly, there 
is a separate and concentrated review of constitutionality, i.e. constitutional ju-
risdiction. Secondly, that this jurisdiction allows for the review of last instance 
judicial decisions before the constitutional court in the form of constitutional 
complaint lodged by an individual. And thirdly, that the system knows the 
right to a lawful judge or has inferred it from more general rights, such as the 
right to fair trial, and it is ready to consider the CJEU to be, in proceedings 
before last instance courts, a lawful judge of its own.37 The reasoning is follow-
ing: If there is an obligation of the CJEU to participate in certain proceedings 
and the national court concerned omits this obligation by failure to bring the 
case before the CJEU, a violation of the right to lawful judge is present.38
The second remedy on the national level may consist in separate proceed-
ings before national courts for breach of EU law, relying on the principle of 
state liability, as elaborated by the CJEU in the Francovich39 and Brasserie 
du Pêcheur/Factortame III cases40 and later on also in Köbler case,41 where 
the prospect of liability in damages for failure of a national Supreme court to 
comply with the EU law was established. However, in the latter case the CJEU 
added that state liability in the context of the court of last instance ‘can be 
incurred only in the exceptional case where the court manifestly infringed the 
applicable law.’ Later on in June 2006 the CJEU took the opportunity to spec-
ify some of the principles that were established by Köbler and in case Traghetti 
del Mediterraneo42 highlighted also, that neither the principle of the indepen-
37  See also: Bobek M.; Learning to Talk: Preliminary rulings, The Courts of the New Mem-
ber States and The Court of Justice; Common Market Law Review (2008); Volume 45, Issue 6; 
pp 1611–1643; page 1629.
38  On the 21.st of November 2013 such an explanation was reached also by the Constitutional 
Court of Republic Slovenia in Decision Up-1056/11-15, where the Constitutional Court set 
aside the judgement of Supreme court and returned the case to the same court for reconsider-
ation.
39  Joint cases C-6 and 9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. (On state 
liability see generally: Craig P. and De Búrca G.; EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials; Fifth 
edition; 2011; Oxford University Press).
40  C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Germany, and R v. Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others [1996] ECR I-1029.
41  Case C-224/01 Köbler v Austria [2003] ECR I-10239.
42  Case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v. Repubblica italiana [2006] ECR I-5177.
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dence of the judiciary nor that of res judicata, can justify general exclusion of 
any state liability for an infringement of EU law attributable to such a national 
court.43 It follows that refraining from making references cannot itself lead to a 
duty to pay damages under EU law, however, when it turns out that a decision 
of a court of last instance was taken in violation of Article 267(3) TFEU, this 
may nevertheless be relevant in assessing whether the Member State in ques-
tion must pay damages for any loss that has been suffered due to the judgment, 
under the condition, that the breach of EU law was manifest and suffi ciently 
serious.44
The only conceivable remedy at the Union level is the procedure for infringe-
ment based on Article 258 TFEU brought by the European Commission (here-
inafter: Commission). It can be invoked, since the Commission has the power 
to start the procedure against a Member State before the CJEU for infringe-
ment of EU law by the organs of that Member State.45 The highest courts of a 
Member State are indeed considered to be State organs, therefore infringement 
procedure against a Member State can be used also for breaches of EU law 
caused by national judicial decisions, as was stated in the CJEU’s judgement 
in case Commission v. Italy.46 On the basis of mentioned procedure the Com-
mission for the fi rst time in 2004 issued a letter of formal notice to Sweden 
for breach of Article 267 TFEU. However, it should be emphasized that the 
Commission is very reluctant to start such procedures, especially since it is 
seen as an attempt to weaken the independency of the highest national courts.47
The possible remedy on the international level is an application to the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (hereinafter: ECtHR), claiming breach 
of Article 6 of the ECHR, where the principle of fair trial is stated. However, 
this remedy for now remains without tangible consequences in practice, con-
sidering the fact, that the ECtHR has not yet found any Member State liable 
for such a breach. The question has nevertheless arisen on several occasions 
43  See also: Chalmers D., Davies G., Monti G.; European Union Law, cases and materials; 
second edition; 2010; Cambridge University Press; page 301-312.
44  See also: Groussot X., Minssen T.; Res judicata in the ECJ Case law: Balancing Legal 
Certainty with Legality?; European Constitutional Law Revie (2007); Issue 3; pp 385-417; 
page 393.
45  See also: Craig P. and De Búrca G., 2011, supra n. 39; Chalmers D., Davies G., Monti G., 
2010, supra n. 43, page 329.
46  See: Case C-129/00 Commission v. Italy [2003] ECR I-14637. However, the Commission 
v. Italy case is concerned with systematic and recurring breaches of EU law by the national ju-
diciary and not exclusively with circumventing the obligation to make a preliminary reference.
47  See also: Vaistendael F., supra n. 22, page 2.
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and provoked the discussion.48 As a consequence the ECtHR in invoked cases 
emphasized, that the ECHR does not as such guarantee any right to have a case 
referred by a domestic court to another national or international authority for 
a preliminary ruling, but added, however, that ‘it is not completely impossible 
that, in certain circumstances, refusal by a domestic court trying a case at 
fi nal instance might infringe the principle of fair trial, as set forth in Article 
6(1) of the ECHR, in particular where such refusal appears arbitrary’.49 It 
thus follows that it cannot be completely ruled out, that a failure to make a 
preliminary reference under Article 267 TFEU could infringe the fairness of 
proceedings and therefore constitute a breach of Article 6 of the ECHR.50
5. CONCLUSION
With the enlargement of the EU and growth of the number of national courts 
within the EU integration already posing great challenges for the functioning 
of the EU court system in general and more specifi cally, for the Article 267 
TFEU procedure, the need to ensure legal unity and a uniform interpretation 
of EU law has grown and not shrank. Such situation does not provide legal 
certainty and makes legal unity within the Union impossible, if all national 
courts (being the ordinary law courts of the EU at the same time) are not 
aware of their role in the European judicial structure. The instruments of State 
liability for judicial acts (Köbler) or infringement proceedings for judicial acts 
(Commission v. Italy) provided at the Union level and also the possibility to 
ask the national Constitutional Courts or even the ECtHR for a review of cases 
which are already decided in the fi nal instance, are undoubtedly possible tools 
and remedies able to strengthen the principles of primacy and effectiveness of 
EU law, but they nevertheless cannot be considered as an alternative for pre-
liminary ruling proceeding. 
The latter established under Article 267 TFEU and described by D. Anderson 
as ‘both the most fundamental and the most intriguing part of the evolving 
48  In his opinion in Köbler case, Advocate General Léger argued for the fi rst time that the 
breach of Article 267 TFEU may give rise to liability of a state for infringement of the ECHR 
but did not analyse thoroughly the conditions of such liability, limiting himself solely to men-
tioning of several examples (Opinion of Advocate General Léger in Case C-224/01 Köbler, 
para. 147).
49  The case of Coëme and others v. Belgium ECHR 2000-VII, para. 114; available at: <hudoc.
echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-59194#{“itemid”:[“001-59194”]}> (12.2.2014); 
Canela Santiago v Spain (Application No. 60350/00) Decision of 4 October 2001; John v Ger-
many [2007] 45 EHRR SE4 ECtHR. 
50  See also: Fenger N., Broberg M., 2011, supra n. 12, page 210.
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judicial architecture of Europe’, since it ‘uniquely, appoints the European 
Court in Luxembourg as meeting-place between the legal order of the Union 
and those of its Member States’51 therefore should remain a constant dialogue 
and expression of interplay between the CJEU and national judges. But for this 
to be able to happen, it is fi rstly the task of national courts, especially those, 
against whose decision there is no appellate procedure and which are under 
obligation to make a reference, whenever they have doubts about validity or the 
right interpretation of EU law provisions.
The CILFIT case, which marked an important stage in the evolution of the 
relationship between the CJEU and national courts by introducing some ex-
ceptions when there is no obligation to start a preliminary reference, there-
fore should not be misused in order to facilitate the procedure before national 
courts and enable them to avoid their obligations under EU law. In contrary, 
the CILFIT case promoted the process of federalization of the judicial system 
of the EU and is an important indication of maturity in the development of the 
EU legal order, demanding to be treated with high responsibility.
Should the national courts of last instance overlook this aspect and abuse the 
purposes established by the CJEU that would have the effect of jeopardizing 
the uniform application and interpretation of EU law throughout the Europe-
an integration and furthermore deprive individuals of the effective judicial 
protection of their rights deriving from EU law. Moreover it could undermine 
the unity of the case law at the European level and even more, prevent further 
development of the EU law itself, since it cannot be underestimated, that some 
major fundamental principles (which had signifi cant consequences for further 
development of the Union legal system) and also a process towards the consti-
tutionalization of the Treaties were all set in motion through the preliminary 
reference procedure. Therefore the national courts of lower and even more last 
instance (while respecting the established case law and conditions specifi ed 
therein) should, would and could with referring questions to the CJEU indicate 
clearly, that they consider the jurisprudence of the CJEU within the framework 
of the preliminary reference procedure as valuable and helpful for them and 
not as an obstacle in the main procedure they are dealing with. While at the 
same time paying respect to the work of the CJEU, they would also confi rm 
their awareness, that effective legal protection of individuals is essential for 
development of EU legal order. 
To conclude national courts should recognize more and more that they are 
also – even in the fi rst place – European law courts and in this regard take over 
51  See also: Anderson D.; References to the European Court; Sweet and Maxwell; London 
1995; page ix.
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responsibilities that come with that. Only in the context of such a European-
ized attitude towards their assignment to the effective legal protection, the EU 
law will become a pre-eminent point of reference for them and an instrument 
helping them to contribute to the progressive realization of living supranation-
al legal order in Europe.
LITERATURE:
  1. Blutman L.; The Cartesio judgment: Empowering lower courts by the European 
Court of Justice; Pravo i Politika (ISSN 1820-7529); Vol. III., 2010/2.; pp. 95-106.
  2. Bobek M.; Learning to Talk: Preliminary rulings, The Courts of the New Mem-
ber States and The Court of Justice; Common Market Law Review (2008); Vol-
ume 45, Issue 6; pp 1611–1643.
  3. Broberg, M.; Acte clair revisited: Adapting the acte clair criteria to the demands 
of the times (2008); Common Market Law Review 4; Issue 5; pp. 1383–1397.
  4. Chalmers D., Davies G., Monti G.; European Union Law, cases and materials; 
second edition; 2010; Cambridge University Press.
  5. Craig P. and De Búrca G.; EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials; Fifth edition; 2011; 
Oxford University Press.
  6. Fenger N., Broberg M.; Finding Light in the Darkness: On the Actual Application 
of the acte clair Doctrine; Yearbook of European Law (2011); Volume 30, Issue 1; 
pp. 180–212.
  7. Groussot X., Minssen T.; Res judicata in the ECJ Case law: Balancing Legal 
Certainty with Legality?; European Constitutional Law Revie (2007); Issue 3; pp 
385-417.
  8. Navratilova M.; The Preliminary Ruling before The Constitutional Courts; 
Ústavní soud, Česká republika; available at: <www.law.muni.cz/sborniky/dp08/
fi les/pdf/mezinaro/navratilova.pdf>.
  9. Tridimas T.; Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Effi ciency and Defi -
ance in the Preliminary Reference Procedure; Common Market Law Review 40 
(2003); pp. 9 - 50.
10. Vaistendael F.; Consequences of the Acte Clair doctrine for the National courts 
and temporal effects of an ECJ decision; K.U.Leuven; 2007; I.B.F.D. Amsterdam.

